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This Article addresses developments in Virginia oil and gas 
law for the period from July 31, 2014 to July 31, 2019. This period is 
longer than normally addressed by this journal to capture important 
developments in the law between this update and the last Virginia 
update published in 2015. At the state level, in Swords Creek Land 
Partnership v. Belcher, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded 
coalbed methane (“CBM”) is a separate and distinct mineral estate 
from coal. It held that the meaning of “coal” within an 1887 severance 
deed was unambiguous and did not intend to convey ownership rights 
to the CBM.1 This decision reaffirmed and expanded the Court’s 




†Mason E. Heidt is the Associate Dean of the Appalachian School of Law and an 
Assistant Professor teaching Property and Natural Resources Law. Joshua Wysor is 
a third-year student at the Appalachian School of Law graduating in 2020.1. 
Swords Creek Land P’ship v. Belcher, 762 S.E.2d 570, 572–73 (Va. 2014). 
 2. Id. at 572; see Harrison-Wyatt, LLC v. Ratliff, 593 S.E.2d 234, 238 (Va. 
2004) (holding that CBM within the GOB is a separate estate not passing by a coal-
only severance deed). 
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Court held that a deed conveying “all coal and minerals” was also 
unambiguous and with the addition of the “and minerals” language 
constituted a transfer of CBM.3  
During this period, the Court also ruled on a number of issues 
relating to the now-pending Atlantic Coast Pipeline (“ACP”). In 
Chaffins v. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, the Court was asked to 
determine whether ACP’s “notices of intent” to enter landowners’ 
properties to conduct preliminary surveys complied with state 
requirements, specifically whether the notices “set forth the date of the 
intended entry” as mandated by statute.4 The Court held that such 
notices must set forth a sufficiently definite period for anticipated 
entry, and that ACP’s stated intent to arrive “on or after” a specified 
date to perform such studies was inadequate.5 In Palmer v. Atlantic 
Coast Pipeline, LLC, the Court faced two questions: (1) whether 
foreign corporations may exercise the same “entry-for-survey” power 
described above in Chaffins; and (2) whether the statutory provision 
allowing such authority became unconstitutional in light of post-Kelo 
amendments to the Virginia Constitution.6 As to the former, the Court 
held that foreign corporations possess the same entry rights as 
domestic corporations.7 As to the latter, the Court held that the post-
Kelo amendments did not create a constitutional right to exclude ACP 
from access to landowners’ properties.8 Finally, in Barr v. Atlantic 
Coast Pipeline, LLC, the Court addressed a trial court’s statutory 
interpretation of the entry-for-survey provision, holding that the 
statute should be read in such a way as to grant natural gas companies 
at least some discretion in determining the most advantageous pipeline 
routes.9 Additionally, the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the 
survey provision, holding that such surveys do not violate the state 
constitution’s takings clause.10 The Court held that the use of a defined 
date “range” (as opposed to a singular date) in a notice-of-intent letter 
did not violate the statute’s “date of . . . intended entry” requirement.11 
 
 3. Dye v. CNX Gas Co., 784 S.E.2d 703, 706 (Va. 2016). 
 4. Chaffins v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 189, 190 (Va. 2017) 
(quoting VA. CODE § 56–49.01(C)). 
 5. Id. at 193. 
 6. Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414, 415, 418 (Va. 2017); 
see VA. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 7. Id. at 417. 
 8. Id. at 419. 
 9. Barr v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 815 S.E.2d 783, 789 (Va. 2018). 
 10. Id. at 790. 
 11. Id. at 791–92 (compare with Chaffins v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 
S.E.2d 189, 193 (Va. 2017) (holding that “on or after” language was impermissible 
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Finally, a more recent case was heard in the Fourth Circuit regarding 
the ability of the Forest Service to issue a Special Use Permit and 
Record of Decision allowing the Atlantic Coast Pipeline to pass 
through National Forest land and across the Appalachian Trail. 
Following the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the case was granted 
certiorari for review by the United States Supreme Court, which is 
now pending.12 
At the federal level, courts are continuing to navigate the legal 
quagmire created by EQT Production Co., v. Adair13 and its progeny. 
Consisting originally of five cases—three with plaintiffs against EQT 
Production Company (“EQT”) and two with plaintiffs against CNX 
Gas Company, LLC (“CNX”)—these cases centered around the issue 
of class certifications under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).14 
Specifically, plaintiffs sought to assert CBM royalty claims against the 
respective companies.15 After the Western District of Virginia 
certified each of the five classes in 2013, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded the cases for a “more 
rigorous analysis” to determine whether the requirements for class 
certification had been satisfied.16 On remand, the Western District 
certified three of the classes in part (the Hale, Adair, and Adkins 
classes) and denied certification for the Addison and Kiser classes.17 
These cases and their impacts are discussed in further detail in Part IV. 
 
II. MINERAL RIGHTS AFTER SWORDS CREEK AND DYE 
 
In 1990, the Virginia Gas and Oil Act was amended to permit 
CBM production to go forward in cases where there was conflict or 
uncertainty as to the ownership of the CBM produced through the use 
of forced pooling.18 Following pooling, royalties for conflicting 
claimants were placed in escrow. The funds remain in escrow until 
 
due to indefiniteness)). 
 12. See Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. Forest Serv., 911 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 
2018), cert. granted sub nom. U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Assn., 
No. 18-1584, 2019 WL 4889926 (Oct. 4, 2019), and cert. granted sub nom. Atl. 
Coast Pipeline, LLC v. Cowpasture River Pres. Assn., No. 18-1587, 2019 WL 
4889930 (Oct. 4, 2019). 
 13. See EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 14. Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., 320 F.R.D. 379, 387 (W.D. Va. 2017). 
 15. Id. at 388. 
 16. Id. (citing EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d at 352). 
 17. Id. at 387. 
 18. Swords Creek Land P’ship v. Belcher, 762 S.E.2d 570, 571 (Va. 2014); see 
VA. CODE § 45.1-361.1 (2019).  
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conflicting claimants reach a voluntary settlement, the claimants’ 
interests have been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
or a final arbitration award has been granted pursuant to state statute.19 
Many of the original conflicting claims are centered around who owns 
the CBM following a severance of the Coal; Coal and Minerals; or a 
more exhaustive list of resources.20 
In Swords Creek, the primary issue centered around an 1887 
severance deed in which the original grantors conveyed “all of the 
coal, in, upon, or underlying a certain tract of land.”21 The parties to 
this appeal were Dollie Belcher, Doris Dye, and Ruby Lawson, 
successors-in-interest to the grantors (i.e. the surface owners), and 
Swords Creek Land Partnership, the successor-in-interest to the 
grantees (i.e. the coal owner).22 In 1991, the Partnership entered into a 
lease agreement which allowed for the extraction of CBM at a royalty 
rate of 12.5% of the value of the gas produced.23 In 1992, CNX Gas, 
LLC, the lessee, petitioned to have a pooling order entered and began 
production.24 Royalty payments due to the CBM owners accrued in 
escrow for nearly twenty years because of conflicting claims. In 2011, 
the surface owners filed suit in circuit court, alleging that they were 
the sole owners of the CBM produced and therefore entitled to all 
existing and future royalty payments.25 In 2013, the court entered a 
declaratory judgment awarding ownership of the CBM and its 
royalties to the surface owners.26 In its decision, the circuit court held 
that the language of the 1887 severance deed was “unambiguous” in 
that it conveyed only the coal and not the associated CBM.27 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined whether 
the original conveyance of “coal” also included a conveyance of the 
CBM. A decade prior to Swords Creek, in Harrison-Wyatt, LLC v. 
Ratliff, the Court held that a severance deed containing similar 
language was intended to convey only solid coal, and that the future 
value of CBM would not have been contemplated in the late 19th 
century, thereby excluding the possibility that the severance deed 
 
 19. Swords Creek, 762 S.E.2d at 571; see VA. CODE § 45.1-361.22:1 (2019). 
 20. See generally The 2010 Pulitzer Prize Winner for Public Service: Bristol 
Herald Courier, PULITZER.ORG, https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/bristol-va-
herald-courier [https://perma.cc/7MFL-VTMM] (last visited Oct. 2019). 
 21. Swords Creek, 762 S.E.2d at 570. 
 22. Id. at 571. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 572. 
 27. Id. at 571–572. 
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grantor intended to convey it.28 Further, the Court in Harrison-Wyatt 
stated, “[A]lthough CBM has a weak physical attraction to coal and 
escapes from coal when coal is mined, it is a gas that exists freely in 
the coal seam and is a distinct mineral estate.”29 In Swords Creek, the 
Court reaffirmed this decision, holding that the CBM belonged solely 
to the surface owners.30 Whereas the CBM in question in Harrison-
Wyatt was contained in the gob—a mined out area that could be 
accessed by merely drilling into the void—the gas in Swords Creek 
was accessed from unmined coal through the use of hydraulic 
fracturing. 31 Notably, the Court in Swords Creek did not answer the 
question of whether a CBM owner has the right to fracture a coal seam 
to access its gas estate as this issue was not raised at trial or on 
appeal.32 
Note that in 2010, Virginia General Assembly passed 
legislation deeming that a “conveyance, reservation, or exception of 
coal” does not include CBM. 33  However, this statute does not 
retroactively affect prior conveyances and therefore did not control the 
Swords Creek decision. 
Note also that, in 2015, the Virginia General Assembly passed 
legislation designed to remove from escrow accrued royalties resulting 
from conflicting claims of CBM ownership.34 Operators of force-
pooled gas wells were required to apply to the Virginia Gas and Oil 
Board for release of the escrowed funds to the gas-claimant and send 
notice of the application to the coal- owning-claimants.35 Within forty-
five days, the coal claimant had to provide evidence of a pending 
proceeding or an agreement with the gas claimant to split royalties.36 
If the coal claimant provided neither or did not respond within the 
allotted time, all future royalties and escrowed past royalties were 
distributed to the gas claimant, usually the surface owner.37 This 
 
 28. Id. at 572. 
 29. Id. (quoting Harrison-Wyatt, LLC v. Ratliff, 593 S.E.2d 234, 238 (Va. 
2004)). 
 30. Id. at 573. 
 31. Id. at 572. 
 32. Id. at 573. 
 33. VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-361.21:1 (2019). 
 34. VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-361.22:2 (2019). 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.; Note that, in order to resolve the conflicting claims and prevent royalties 
from accumulating in escrow, some surface owners and coal owners, given the 
uncertainty in the law prior to Swords Creek, had entered into “Split Agreements” 
whereby the coal owner and surface owner voluntarily agreed to split royalties. 
 37. Id.  
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legislation successfully significantly reduced the amount of funds held 
in escrow.  
The Supreme Court of Virginia again took up the task of 
interpreting the language of 19th century conveyances in 2016, this 
time evaluating the meaning of “minerals” within two separate 
severance deeds. In Dye, the Court examined two severance deeds 
from 1886 and 1887, respectively, both of which conveyed “all of the 
coal and minerals” underlying tracts in Buchanan and Russell 
counties.38 In her complaint, Nella Dye, successor-in-interest to the 
property rights maintained by the original grantors, alleged that the 
1886 and 1887 conveyances were not intended to sever or convey the 
underlying natural gas.39  
Buckhorn Coal Company, successor-in-interest to the property 
rights conveyed to the original severance grantees, and CNX (a lessee 
of Buckhorn’s interest), filed demurrers to Dye’s complaint. Both 
Buckhorn and CNX alleged that under established case precedent, a 
broad conveyance of “minerals” included natural gas.40 Specifically, 
the demurrers cited Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., a 1936 Virginia 
Supreme Court decision in which the Court defined petroleum, oil, 
and gas as “minerals” for the purposes of an 1887 severance deed.41 
Dye, in turn, claimed that the term “minerals” is ambiguous, a claim 
which, if sustained, would allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence 
to prove the grantor’s intent.42 In Dye, the circuit court sustained 
appellees’ demurrers, citing the Court’s previous holding in Warren.43 
In affirming the circuit court’s holding, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
noted that the Warren decision follows the majority rule in most 
jurisdictions, i.e., a conveyance of “minerals” conveys all minerals, 
including CBM gas, unless a different intent is shown or other 
language in the deed “creates sufficient ambiguity to permit the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence.” 44  
 
III. THE ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE CASES 
 
 
 38. Dye v. CNX Gas Co., 784 S.E.2d 703, 704 (Va. 2016) (Note that the 1887 
deed conveyed “all of the coal and other minerals”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 186 S.E.2d 20, 21 (Va. 1936). 
 42. Dye, 784 S.E.2d at 704. 
 43. Id. at 704–705. 
 44. Id. at 706 n.2. 
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Between 2017 and 2018, the Supreme Court of Virginia heard 
three cases concerning ACP-related property surveys and 
environmental studies. In each case, the issues centered around the 
interpretation and/or constitutionality of Virginia Code Section 56-
49.01, which authorizes “certain natural gas companies to enter upon 
property, without permission, for examinations, tests, hand auger 
borings, appraisals and surveys.”45  
In Chaffins, appellant-landowners received letters from ACP 
seeking permission to enter their properties to conduct preliminary 
surveys and studies.46 ACP explained that conducting the surveys and 
environmental studies was “required as part of the permitting process 
for the pipeline.”47 When the landowners refused, ACP provided 
notices indicating its intent to enter the properties “on or after April 
27, 2015” pursuant to Virginia Code Section 56-49.01.48 ACP then 
filed petitions for declaratory judgment against the landowners, 
alleging its right to enter landowners’ properties.49 Landowners 
responded by filing demurrers, arguing in part that the notices failed 
to set forth “the date of the intended entry,” as required by statute.50 
The circuit court overruled the demurrers, finding there was “no flaw 
in the notification process.”51 When ACP’s petition proceeded to a 
hearing on the merits, the circuit court again rejected appellants’ 
argument, holding that the notices need only provide a “hope[ful]” 
date of entry that “may have to change” depending on factors such as 
weather and workloads at other properties.52 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of Virginia emphasized that at each step of the notice process, 
state statute requires at least fifteen days’ advance notice to 
landowners prior to entering private property.53 In this context, the 
Court concluded, the notices’ proposed dates of entry must be definite 
in order to be valid. ACP’s use of “on or after” language did not meet 
this standard. Thus, the decision of the circuit court was reversed.54 
In Palmer, the appellant, Hazel Palmer, owned real property in 
Virginia along one of the ACP’s proposed routes.55 On March 6, 2015, 
 
 45. Chaffins v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, 801 S.E.2d 189, 190 (Va. 2017). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 56-49.01(C) (2019)).  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 191; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-49.01(A)-(C) (2019). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, 801 S.E.2d 414, 415 (Va. 2017). 
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ACP sent Palmer a letter seeking permission to enter her property in 
order to conduct preliminary surveys.56 After Palmer refused, ACP 
provided a notice of intent pursuant to Virginia Code Section 56-
49.01.57 Palmer continued to refuse access, and ACP subsequently 
filed a petition for declaratory judgment asserting ACP’s rights to 
access and survey the property.58 Palmer responded by filing a plea at 
bar, alleging in her complaint that Virginia Code Section 56-49.01 
only applied to domestic public service companies because the statute 
is located within Title 56 of the Code of Virginia.59 Additionally, 
Palmer filed a demurrer, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional 
in light of post-Kelo amendments to Article I, Section 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.60 The circuit court rejected both of Palmer’s 
arguments, concluding that the statute’s placement within Title 56 did 
not amount to an “implied definition” of what constitutes a natural gas 
company.61 Further, the court held that similar constitutionality 
arguments alleging takings without just compensation have been 
“consistently rejected.”62  
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the rights 
and privileges contained in Virginia Code Section 56-49.01 extend to 
both domestic and foreign corporations.63 The Court cited Virginia 
Code Section 56-1, which defined corporations as “all corporations 
. . . doing business [in the Commonwealth].”64 The Court then 
addressed a second argument by Palmer concerning Article IX, 
Section 5 of the Constitution of Virginia. Specifically, this Section 
declares that “[n]o foreign corporation shall be authorized to carry on 
in this Commonwealth the business of, or to exercise any of the powers 
or functions of, a public service enterprise.”65 While potentially 
persuasive, the Court was barred from considering this argument, 
having neither been presented at the circuit court nor raised in 
 
 56. Id. at 415–16. 
 57. Id. at 416. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (quoting Charlottesville Div. v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. 
Supp. 3d 673, 690 (W.D. Va. 2015)).  
 63. Id. at 417. 
 64. Id. (quoting VA. CODE § 56-1 (2016)); see 15 U.S.C. § 717(a)(6) (2012) 
(defining a “natural gas company” as any gas company “engaged in the 
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate 
commerce of such gas for resale”).  
 65. Id. (quoting VA. CONST. art. IX, § 5). 
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appellant’s opening brief on appeal.66 Finally, the Court considered 
whether Virginia Code Section 56-49.01 violated post-Kelo67 
revisions to Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia. In 
addressing this issue, the Court cited the common law privilege to 
enter private property for limited purposes.68 As stated by the 
American Law Institute, the privilege applies “where an employee of 
a public utility is . . . authorized to enter upon privately owned land 
for the purpose of making surveys preliminary to instituting a 
proceeding for taking by eminent domain.”69 Further, the Court noted, 
the common law privilege to enter property for the limited purpose of 
surveys has been codified in Virginia law for at least 235 years.70 
Consequently, the Court concluded that Palmer’s right to exclude 
others from her private property was not absolute.71 Thus, the holding 
of the circuit court was affirmed.72 
In Barr, the Supreme Court of Virginia again faced 
interpreting the language of Virginia Code Section 56-49.01, this time 
considering whether ACP was only entitled to conduct activities that 
were “necessary” to the selection of the most advantageous pipeline 
route.73 Similar to Chaffins and Palmer, appellant-landowners 
received letters from ACP requesting access to their properties for the 
limited purpose of conducting preliminary surveys.74 After being 
denied access, ACP sent letters of intent to exercise its authority 
pursuant to Virginia Code Section 56-49.01.75 ACP then filed petitions 
for declaratory judgment against the landowners, seeking affirmation 
of its rights under the statute.76 The landowners demurred, alleging 
inter alia that ACP failed to meet statutory requirements and that such 
entry represented an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
11 of the Virginia Constitution.77 The circuit court rejected appellants’ 
constitutionality arguments, noting that the statute did not provide 
ACP with an “unlimited right of entry with regard to date, scope, or 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
 68. Palmer, 801 S.E.2d at 418. 
 69. Id. (quoting Restatement of Torts § 211 cmt. c (1934) (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. at 418–19. 
 71. Id. at 419. 
 72. Id. at 420. 
 73. Barr v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, 815 S.E.2d 783, 784 (Va. 2018). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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duration.”78 However, the trial court did conclude that ACP’s notices 
of intent were deficient under Virginia Code Section 56-49.01(A), as 
they did not indicate the specified dates that ACP would enter the 
properties.79 After amending its notices, ACP filed a second petition 
for declaratory judgment against appellant-landowners.80 Again, the 
landowners filed demurrers—which were rejected by the trial court—
followed by responsive pleadings.81 At trial, the landowners’ primary, 
and perhaps most persuasive, argument centered around a 
“disjunctive,” as opposed to “conjunctive” interpretation of Virginia 
Code Section 56-49.01. The language at issue states that corporations 
may conduct surveys “as are necessary (i) to satisfy any regulatory 
requirements and (ii) for the selection of the most advantageous 
location or route.”82 Under a conjunctive approach (as proposed by 
appellants), ACP would be required to satisfy the requirements of both 
(i) and (ii) to exercise a lawful right of entry. Under appellants’ theory, 
ACP failed to demonstrate that it had pre-selected the most 
advantageous route and was thus unable to enter the landowners’ 
private property. However, under a disjunctive approach ACP need 
only satisfy one of the requirements to exercise a right of entry. This 
was the interpretation adopted by the trial court.83 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial 
court’s use of the disjunctive approach, stating that to rule otherwise 
would counter state legislative intent and “render certain portions of 
the statute meaningless.”84 For example, the Court wrote that certain 
activities under romanette (ii) are necessarily performed independent 
of the satisfaction of regulatory requirements under romanette (i).85 
Thus, the Court held, it would be illogical to interpret the statute using 
a conjunctive approach.86 Determining that ACP’s proposed entry 
onto landowners’ properties was lawful under the trial court’s 
disjunctive interpretation, the Court did not have to reach the question 
of whether an unlawful taking had occurred.87 Thus, the ruling of the 
circuit court was affirmed.88 
 
 78. Id. at 785. 
 79. Id.; cf. Chaffins v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, 801 S.E.2d 189 (Va. 2017). 
 80. Barr, 815 S.E.2d at 785. 
 81. Id. 
 82. VA. CODE § 56-49.01(A) (2019). 
 83. Barr, 815 S.E.2d at 786. 
 84. Id. at 788–89. 
 85. Id. at 789. 
 86. Id. at 790. 
 87. Id. at 792. 
 88. Id. 
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In Cowpasture River Preservation Association v. Forest 
Service, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the United States 
Forest Service had “complied with the National Forest Management 
Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Mineral Leasing 
Act in issuing a Special Use Permit and Record of Decision 
authorizing Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, the project developer, to 
construct the Atlantic Coast Pipeline through parts of the George 
Washington and Monongahela National Forests and granting a right 
of way across the Appalachian National Scenic Trail.”89 
The Court considered whether the Forest Service’s granting of 
the Special Use Permit and Record of Decision was arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
the law.90  After an extensive review of the permitting process and 
finding failures in the process at several points, the court found: 
A thorough review of the record leads to the necessary 
conclusion that the Forest Service abdicated its responsibility to 
preserve national forest resources. This conclusion is particularly 
informed by the Forest Service’s serious environmental concerns that 
were suddenly, and mysteriously, assuaged in time to meet a private 
pipeline company’s deadlines.91 
The Forest Service’s decisions regarding the Special Use 
Permit and Record of Decision were vacated and the issue remanded 
to the Forest Service for further proceedings. Following appeal, writs 
of certiorari have been granted for review by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.92 
 
IV. ADAIR AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The federal Adair cases have developed a long and complex 
procedural history with the first complaint going back as far as June 
2010.93 The cases consist of five then-proposed classes (Hale, Adair, 
Adkins, Addison, and Kiser), each alleging its class members were 
unlawfully deprived of CBM royalty payments owed to them by either 
EQT or CNX. On September 30, 2013, each of the five classes were 
 
 89. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. Forest Serv., 911 F.3d 150, 154–55 (4th 
Cir. 2018). 
 90. Id. at 160. 
 91. Id. at 183. 
 92. Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, No. 18-1584, 2019 WL 
4889926 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2019); Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC v. Cowpasture River 
Pres. Ass’n, No. 18-1587, 2019 WL 4889930 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2019). 
 93. EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 355 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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certified in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2), 
and 23(b)(3).94 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit vacated and remanded the five class certifications for further 
analysis by the district court.95 In its decision, the Fourth Circuit 
provided a five-factor test in determining whether to grant a class 
certification. These factors are: 
(1) whether the certification ruling is likely dispositive of the 
litigation; (2) whether the district court’s certification decision 
contains a substantial weakness; (3) whether the appeal will permit the 
resolution of an unsettled legal question of general importance; (4) the 
nature and status of the litigation before the district court (such as the 
presence of outstanding dispositive motions and the status of 
discovery); and (5) the likelihood that future events will make 
appellate review more or less appropriate.96 
In its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit determined that the district 
court’s analysis “lacked the requisite rigor to ensure the requirements 
of Rule 23 were satisfied by any of the certified classes.”97 However, 
the court did not preclude the possibility of the district court regranting 
certification to one or more classes.98 The court simply held that the 
original certifications by the district court had been premature. 
On remand, the district court granted certifications in part to 
the Hale, Adair, and Adkins classes and denied certification to the 
Addison and Kiser classes.99 After a nearly fifty-page analysis, the 
district court set out the allowed issues under each certification. The 
Hale class was certified as to the following issues: (1) allegedly 
excessive deductions; (2) royalties based on allegedly improperly low 
prices; (3) deduction of severance taxes; and (4) request for an 
accounting.100 The Adair class was certified as to all of the issues in 
 
 94. See Adkins v. EQT Prod. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140623 (W.D. Va., 
Sept. 30, 2013); Addison v. CNX Gas Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140622 (W.D. 
Va., Sept. 30, 2013); Hale v. CNX Gas Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140617 (W.D. 
Va., Sept. 30, 2013); Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140611 (W.D. 
Va., Sept. 30, 2013); Legard v. EQT Prod. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140618 
(W.D. Va., Sept. 30, 2013). 
 95. EQT Prod. Co., 764 F.3d at 371. 
 96. Id. at 357 (quoting Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 
2001)). 
 97. Id. at 371. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., 320 F.R.D. 379, 429–430 (W.D. Va. 2017). 
 100. Id. at 429. 
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the Hale class except the claim of allegedly excessive deductions.101 
Finally, the Adkins class was certified as to (1) allegedly improper 
deduction of marketability costs and (2) royalties based on improperly 
low prices.102 Following resolution of the class certification issue, 
Hale and Adair were each dismissed in 2019 upon reaching a 
negotiated class settlement. Addison, Adkins, and Kiser were 




 101. Id. at 430. 
 102. Id. 
